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Some objections to the metalinguistic theory of proper names

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Kleiber (1981) brilliantly defended a semantic theory of proper names according to which a proper name N is the abbreviation of the denominative predicate “being called /N/ (s)” (cf. pp. 325-416). He refused to call his theory metalinguistic because he thought that the denominative predicate “being called /N/ (s)” is not metalinguistic; rather, he argued that it is mundane:

En demandant à quelqu’un son nom, on ne se renseigne pas sur le langage, alors que si l’on demande le nom de l’outil qui sert à tailler les vignes, l’interrogation porte sur le code linguistique. 13) est une question non métalinguistique, « mondaine », alors que 14) représente une interrogation métalinguistique :

13) Quel est ton nom ?
14) Quel est le nom de l’outil qui sert à tailler les vignes ? (p. 394)

However, we can call Kleiber’s theory metalinguistic in another sense, because in this theory the signifier1 of a proper name is part of the meaning of the proper name itself. In this paper, we evaluate Kleiber’s semantic theory of proper names. In the first section we illustrate some of the advantages it offers. However, these merits notwithstanding, in the second section we show that the theory faces some difficulties: it implies that synonymous proper names cannot exist and that proper names cannot be translated from one language into others. In fact, synonymous proper names do seem to exist and proper names do seem to be translatable. In

1 For signifier I mean here the phonetic chain of the proper name. I do not presuppose that, when this phonetic chain is part of the meaning of the name, it must have a meaning in turn, so triggering a vicious circle. Thus, my argument is very different from that of Wilmet (1991). Kleiber himself delineates his own view in the terms used here: « S’il agit de rendre compte de la particularité du sens de noms propres, nous dirons que leur signifiant fait partie de leur représentation sémantique » (Kleiber, 1981: 397).
the third section we evaluate whether the criticisms advanced in the second section can also be extended to more recent versions of Kleiber’s semantic theory of proper names. The fourth section concludes the paper.

**Merits of the metalinguistic theory**

Metalinguistic theory has numerous advocates both among linguists and philosophers of language (cf., among others, Burge, 1973, Recanati, 1993, Katz, 1994, Geurts, 1997, Fara, forthcoming). The reason for this success is that the theory offers several advantages. Here we will consider the following two advantages: first, it represents a good compromise between direct reference theories and description theories of proper names; second, it allows a unified treatment of standard and so-called modified uses of proper names.

**Compromise**

Metalinguistic theory seems to be a good mediation between direct reference theories, according to which the meaning of a proper name is its referent, and description theories, according to which a proper name is synonymous with a definite description or a family of definite descriptions.

Until the 1970s, description theories, inspired by Frege (1892), prevailed. According to this kind of theories, a proper name $N$ is synonymous with a definite description $D$ or with a family of definite descriptions $D^*$. For instance, a proper name like ‘Reims’ is thought to be synonymous with a definite description, such as ‘the most populous city of the Marne department’, or with a family of definite descriptions, such as ‘the most populous city of the Marne department; the city where the champagnes Veuve Clicquot, Mumm and Tattinger are produced; the city where the ancient kings of France were crowned, etc.’. In order to know the meaning of a name $N$, a speaker must know the description $D$ or (at least) some of the descriptions $D^*$. Such a description, or a family of descriptions, refers to a unique referent, which is also the referent of $N$.

This kind of theories has undergone a crisis since the early 1970s as a result of the criticisms advanced by the direct reference theorists, particularly Kripke (1980). Kripke claims that if a proper name $N$ were synonymous with a definite description $D$ or a family of definite descriptions $D^*$, we could not imagine a situation in which $N$ is not $D$ or $D^*$. However, this is not usually the case. For instance, it is false that we cannot imagine a situation in which Reims is not the most populous city of
the Marne department. Épernay could have been more populous than Reims. There also exists a possible (even if not actual) situation in which Épernay is more populous than Reims. As a consequence, sentence (1) is true:

1) Reims could have not been the most populous city of the Marne department.

Now, if the definite description ‘the most populous city of the Marne department’ and the proper name ‘Reims’ were synonymous, sentence (2) should not only be false, but also contradictory:

2) Reims is not the most populous city of the Marne department.

This should be so for the same reason why sentence (3) is contradictory:

3) A square does not have four sides.

However, since (1) is true, (2), although false, is not contradictory. By consequence, the proper name ‘Reims’ cannot be synonymous with ‘the most populous city of the Marne department’. The same argument can be made regarding the definite descriptions in D*: Reims may not have been the city where the kings of France were crowned, where many champagne producers have their headquarters, etc. The name ‘Reims’ is not synonymous with any of these descriptions and, therefore, with the family of descriptions D*.

The conclusion argued by direct reference theorists is that the meaning of a proper name is reduced to its reference. In other words, the meaning of ‘Reims’ is the city of Reims in flesh and bones. According to descriptivists, the meaning is formed by concepts graspable by the mind; according to direct reference theorists, however, the meaning is formed by worldly individuals.

Kleiber (1981) rejects direct reference theories (pp. 355-357) because he believes that the meaning of a word cannot be formed by a worldly individual, but must be a concept. Thus, he embraces descriptivism. However, Kleiber is well aware of the objections which have been addressed to this kind of theory (pp. 375-378) and his aim is to propose a version of descriptivism which is capable of resolving these objections. Whereas we can imagine a situation in which Reims is not the most populous city of the Marne department, we cannot imagine a situation in which the name ‘Reims’ is used to refer to Reims, but Reims is not called /Reims/. If the proper name ‘Reims’ is used to refer to this city, Reims must have the property of being called /Reims/. In all these cases, the
predicate ‘being called /Reims/ (\(x\))’ is true of Reims and the definite description ‘the \(x\) such that \(x\) is called /Reims/’ refers to Reims. This definite description, unlike other definite descriptions, seems to escape from the objections of direct reference theorists.

The metalinguistic solution is a good solution to the debate between descriptivism and referentialism. On the one hand, it does not reduce meaning to the referent, but on the other hand, it does not identify meaning with the definite descriptions usually proposed by descriptivists. Rather, it identifies meaning with a metalinguistic definite description, which even some direct reference theorists have accepted (cf. for instance, Recanati, 1993).

**Uniform treatments**

Beyond their standard uses, proper names also have other uses, which will be called *modified* here:

4) a. There are three Georges here.
   b. Most Georges are blond.
   c. Every George I know is married.

One of the merits of metalinguistic theory is its uniform treatment of standard and modified uses of proper names. The idea is as follows. In a sentence where a proper name has a standard use, like (5), the proper name expresses the metalinguistic predicate ‘being called /George/(\(x\))’:

5) George is arriving tomorrow.

One must suppose that in a case like (5), the predicate is determined by a hidden definite article (or, as suggested by Kleiber 1981: 387, by the \(t\) operator) and that (5) is equivalent to (6):

6) \(t x\) (being called /George/(\(x\))) is arriving tomorrow.

The claim that in (5) there is a hidden definite article is not entirely arbitrary since in many languages proper names, in their standard uses, are preceded by a definite article. One can thus assume that sometimes the article is visible and sometimes it is hidden.

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3 Given a predicate \(P(x)\), \(t x(P(x))\) means that there exists a unique individual that satisfies the predicate.

4 *Cf.*, for instance, ‘la France’ and ‘le Rhin’ in French and ‘la Francia’ and ‘il Reno’ in Italian. An anonymous referee objects that each language has a particular
In the sentences (4), on the contrary, the predicate ‘being called /George/($x$)’ is determined by the determiners of the noun phrases (‘three’, ‘most’, ‘every’). The sentences in (4) are synonymous with those in (7):

7) a. There are [three $x$: $x$ is called /George/] here.
b. [Most $x$: $x$ is called /George/] are blond.
c. [Every $x$: $x$ is called /George/ and I know $x$] is married.

Metalinguistic theory can offer a uniform treatment of sentences (4) and (5): proper names express metalinguistic predicates in any case, even if they are determined by different determiners. The competing theories are forced to adopt a different treatment of (4) and (5). Direct reference theorists claim that in standard uses, like (5), proper names mean their referents; however, these theorists cannot extend this thesis to modified uses, like those in (4). Classic descriptivism affirms that a proper name such as ‘George’ means a definite description (e.g. ‘Mary’s son’), but cannot say the same thing of modified uses.

Metalinguistic theory is thus more generalizable than direct reference theory and classical descriptivism, and this is definitely an advantage with respect to rival theories.

Some objections to metalinguistic theory

In the first section some merits of metalinguistic theory have been illustrated. However, I believe that this theory must deal with a number of difficulties. We will examine two of them. The first difficulty is grounded on the fact that some proper names are translated from one language into others. The second difficulty is rooted in the fact that some names belonging to a certain language seem to be synonymous, i.e. to have the same meaning in that language.

configuration of uses for the definite article, so the operator $t$ is an oversimplification. However, if it is true that the generic uses of the definite article differ much from one language to another, the uses of the definite article in English, French, and Italian definite descriptions are sufficiently similar to believe that a single meaning is involved here or at least a class of very close meanings. Recall that the operator $t$ is intended to formalize only the meaning of the definite article in definite descriptions and not its generic uses.
Translatability

Not every proper name is translated from language to language. For instance, the proper name ‘Georges Kleiber’ is not translated and also non-French speakers use such a name to refer to Georges Kleiber. However, some proper names are translated. For example, the proper name ‘London’ is translated as ‘Londres’ in French, as ‘Londra’ in Italian, etc.\(^5\) Now, metalinguistic theory predicts that when a proper name \(N_1\) belonging to the language \(L_1\) is translated into the language \(L_2\) as \(N_2\), then \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) cannot have the same meaning in the two languages, i.e. \(N_1\) cannot mean in \(L_1\) what \(N_2\) means in \(L_2\). According to metalinguistic theory, the signifier is part of the meaning of the proper name. Since \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) have different signifiers, they must have different meanings. Let us see how this happens with an example. According to metalinguistic theory, ‘London’ means (8) in English:

8) The city called /London/

In French, ‘Londres’ means (9):

9) La ville appelée /Londres/

Therefore, (8) does not mean in English what (9) means in French because the signifier /London/ is different from the signifier /Londres/.

\(^5\) An anonymous referee objects that these are not translations but phonological adaptations. This is a complex issue, which would deserve a closer examination. Here I will make only some brief remarks. First, it is questionable that phonological adaptations are not translations. For instance, the Italian word equipaggio is a phonological adaptation of the French word équipage. Does it follow that, when we substitute équipage with equipaggio in translating a French text into Italian, we are not really translating after all? I think not. Second, sometimes the phonological adaptation is so pronounced that the signifiers of the two words in the respective languages have little in common. *Cf.*, for instance, the French adaptation Pékin of the Chinese Beijing. Third, proper names in different languages are not always phonological adaptations. In Italy, for instance, there is a city whose Italian name is Vipiteno and whose German name is Sterzing. These are definitely translations. In general, in order to deal with this issue, a precise definition of what a translation of a word is would be needed. My favorite one is the following: given the linguistic form \(f_1\) meaning \(m\) in language \(L_1\), the translation of this word into \(L_2\) is the substitution of the linguistic form \(f_1\) with a linguistic form \(f_2\) meaning \(m\) or something very similar in \(L_2\). If this definition is correct, phonological adaptations are in fact translations.
The metalinguistic theorist must conclude that ‘London’ does not mean in English what ‘Londres’ means in French.\(^6\)

Intuitively, this conclusion is false: ‘Londres’ seems to be a quite accurate French translation of the English proper name ‘London’. For example, (11) is an unexceptionable translation of (10):

10) London is pretty.
11) Londres est belle.

The same conclusion can be extended to any translation of a proper name. If \( N_1 \neq N_2 \), the metalinguistic theorist must conclude that \( N_1 \) has a different meaning from \( N_2 \), even if this does not seem to be the case.

**Synonymous proper names**

Our second argument is grounded on the relationships between proper names belonging to the same languages. In particular, metalinguistic theory has the consequence of denying the existence of synonymous proper names within a single language.\(^7\) Suppose that in a certain language \( L \) there exist two proper names \( N \) and \( M \) referring to the same object. According to metalinguistic theory, the meanings of \( N \) and \( M \) are as follows:

12) The unique \( x \) called /\( N/\)
13) The unique \( x \) called /\( M/\)

(12) and (13) are clearly different. Again, this difference depends on the fact that \( N \) and \( M \) have two different signifiers. Since the signifier is part of the meaning according to metalinguistic theory, proper names with different signifiers must necessarily have different meanings. Thus, \( N \) and \( M \) have necessarily different meanings. This conclusion can be extended to every couple of coreferential proper names of every language: insofar as these names have different signifiers, they have different meanings as well.

\(^6\) Kleiber (1981: 399) explicitly denies that proper names can be translated from language to language: « Les autonymes comme les noms propres ne se laissent pas traduire […] parce que dans leur sens réapparaît leur Signifiant […]. Si l’on veut garder constant le Signifié d’un nom propre, on ne peut substituer à son Signifiant un autre Signifiant. Changer le nom propre anglais Brown en Brun entraîne automatiquement un changement de Signifié puisque le sens ‘être appelé /Brown/’ est converti en ‘être appelé /Brun/.’. »

\(^7\) Kleiber (1981: 415-6) explicitly denies the existence of synonymous proper names.
However, one could reject this conclusion by claiming that there are some synonymous proper names. Indeed, if the following conditions are met, N and M do seem to be synonymous:

a. N and M have the same referent.
b. Speakers of L know that N and M have the same referent.
c. Speakers of L associate the same pieces of information with N and M.

If these conditions are met, speakers associate the same referent with N and M and the same pieces of information (the same extension and the same intension, to use classical terms). In these cases it is hard to see how proper names can mean different things.

Are there cases of this kind? I believe there are. The star α Scorpii has two different proper names, ‘Antares’ and ‘Calbalacrab’. The first is more popular than the second, but they both meet the conditions listed above. Those who use these names (professional and amateur astronomers) know that they refer to the same star and do not associate different pieces of information with them. These users know that both ‘Antares’ and ‘Calbalacrab’ refer to the red supergiant at the centre of the constellation of Scorpius, of which it is the most luminous star. These two names are good candidates for being synonymous. If they are, metalinguistic theory, which implies the impossibility of synonymous proper names, is disproved.

How could the metalinguistic theorist respond to this argument? He might insist that ‘Antares’ and ‘Calbalacrab’ are not synonymous, even if speakers associate the same referent and the same pieces of information with them. In fact, he might argue that the same referent is presented in two different linguistic ways, as the referent of ‘Antares’ and as the referent of ‘Calbalacrab’, and this suffices to mark a difference in meaning. The meanings of the proper names would be as follows:

14) The unique x called /Antares/  
15) The unique x called /Calbalacrab/

However, this counterargument is too strong. It demonstrates too much, i.e. that two synonymous words cannot exist in any language. Consider any couple of synonymous common nouns, for instance, ‘doctor’ and
‘physician’. Since they are synonymous, they have the same extension. Moreover, they refer to the same class of objects by means of the same concept, i.e. they have the same intension. However, following the metalinguistic theorist’s argument, one could argue that these words are not actually synonymous because they present the same class of objects in two different linguistic ways, i.e. as the class denoted by the word ‘doctor’ and as the class denoted by the word ‘physician’. If this suffices to mark a difference in meaning, then ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ should not be synonymous, even though they share the same extension and the same intension. Since the same reasoning can be extended to every couple of alleged synonymous words, one must conclude that no synonymous words exist in any language. However, this conclusion clearly appears to be too strong.

The same kind of argument can be mounted against what Kleiber (1981: 359-360) says to demonstrate that two coreferential names can never be synonymous. He claims that coreferential names can never be substituted in a context such as the following:

16) N is so called because…

Returning to the example of Antares and Calbalacrab, we can see that the substitution is indeed impossible:

17) Antares is so called because its red colour makes it similar to Mars (Ares).
18) *Calbalacrab is so called because its red colour makes it similar to Mars (Ares).

However, this is not a good test to rule out that two words are synonymous. If it were, no couple of words would be synonymous, as evidenced by the following example:

19) Doctors are so called because of their doctrine.
20) *Physicians are so called because of their doctrine.

8 If you think they are not, you can substitute ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ with a more plausible couple of synonymous nouns. It could be objected that ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ have different phraseologies and pattern of use in discourse. Note, however, that I am supposing that these two names have the same code meaning and not the same discourse meaning. This suffices to cast doubt on the metalinguistic theory that must assume that two names with the same extension and the same intension have two different code meanings and not only different discourse meanings.
In fact, ‘so’ in (16) seems to make reference to the form of the words rather than to their meaning; thus, two words with two different signifiers are not interchangeable in (16), even if they have the same meaning.

If it is true that some coreferential proper names are synonymous, then one can draw different conclusions than Kleiber’s regarding coreferential proper names which are not synonymous. Kleiber (1981, pp. 359-360) states that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have different meanings because they mean (21) and (22), respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
21) & \text{The unique } x \text{ called } /Hesperus/ \\
22) & \text{The unique } x \text{ called } /Phosphorus/ 
\end{align*}
\]

Yet, we can put forth another interpretation of the fact that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are not synonymous. Recall that two names should meet three conditions in order to be synonymous. We repeat them here:

a. N and M have the same referent.

b. Speakers of L know that N and M have the same referent.

c. Speakers of L associate the same pieces of information with N and M.

Condition 1 is met because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same object (Venus). Condition 2 is also met at least since the Babylonians have discovered that the morning and the evening stars are the same celestial body. However, condition 3 is not met. Speakers associate with ‘Hesperus’ the piece of information that the referent is the very luminous celestial body visible just after sunset near the point where the Sun has set; moreover, speakers associate with ‘Phosphorus’ the piece of information that the referent is the very luminous celestial body visible just before dawn near the point where the Sun will rise. Since the two pieces of information are different, the two proper names are not synonymous. In other words, the two names have the same extension (the same referent), but different intensions (the referent is picked up by means of different concepts). ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are not synonymous because they have

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9 Recall that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are two of the names given to the planet Venus in ancient times. Venus is often visible in the evening just after sunset and in the morning just before dawn. The Ancients did not realize that it was the same planet and called the evening star ‘Hesperus’ and the morning star ‘Phosphorus’. The Babylonians discovered that they were actually the same celestial body.
different signifiers, but because two different concepts are associated with them.

Descriptive senses and procedural senses: the new theory of proper names of Kleiber (1995)

Kleiber (1995) (cf. also Kleiber, 1996 and 2004) partially changed his mind about the meaning of proper names, claiming that “x called /N/” is not a descriptive but a procedural sense:

[…] on n’assimile pas tout contenu sémantique à un contenu descriptif, ou sens représentationnel ou encore vériconditionnel […] Si l’on accepte ainsi l’idée que tout sens n’a pas à être exprimé en termes descriptifs ou prédicatifs, mais peut avoir le statut d’instruction ou de procédure indiquant à l’allocutaire comment procéder pour trouver la bonne interprétation et, en l’occurrence, pour les expressions référentielles, comment accéder au référent, il est possible de conserver l’hypothèse d’un sens dénominatif pour les noms propres. (Kleiber, 1995: 26)

The meaning “the x such that x is called /N/” must not be understood as a descriptive sense, but as an instruction given by the speaker to the addressee in order to find out the referent. By uttering the proper name N, the speaker gives the instruction to find out the object called /N/ to the addressee.

How should we evaluate this new theory? Are the arguments we have mounted against the theory of Kleiber (1981) also valid against the theory of Kleiber (1995)? Although I think that Kleiber’s (1995) later theory is more difficult to evaluate than the previous one, there are reasons to believe that the criticisms advanced in the second section are also valid against this new version of Kleiber’s theory. In particular, there are two elements that would suggest this conclusion. The first one is that, according to Kleiber, the procedural sense, which is now believed to be the meaning of proper names, is still a fully-fledged meaning:

S’agit-il encore de sens ? Nous pensons que oui, dans la mesure où nous entendons par sens ce qui est conventionnellement attaché à l’expression elle-même, son contenu intrinsèque en somme (Kleiber, 1995 : 27)

The procedural sense is conventionally linked to the proper name and, therefore, is its conventional meaning. Secondly, the signifier of a proper name is still part of such procedural sense. The proper name expresses « l’instruction de chercher ou de trouver le référent qui porte le nom en question » (Kleiber, 1995: 26). The signifier of a proper name is still part of
its meaning insofar as the instruction which forms the meaning prescribes to find out the referent to which that signifier is linked.

These two features of the theory, i.e. the fact that the procedural sense is the meaning of the name and the fact that the signifier is part of this meaning, are sufficient for the arguments advanced above to be mounted again. A proper name cannot be translated from language to language preserving the same meaning because the two names will express two different instructions; for instance, the instruction to find out the referent of N and the instruction to find out the referent of M. However, there are many examples in which a proper name is translated from one language into another language. Of course, if Paul is called /Paolo/ in Italy, the instructions to find the individual called /Paolo/ and the individual called /Paul/ would lead to the same individual. However, they are not the same instruction. If a certain place can be reached through two different paths, the instruction of following the first path is different from the instruction of following the second path, even if the two paths would lead to the same spot. Furthermore, the existence of synonymous proper names in a single language would be impossible because, again, the two names would express different meanings insofar as the signifier is part of the meaning. However, good examples of synonymous proper names seem to exist in several languages.

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10 Kleiber compares the procedural sense of proper names with that of indexicals: “je a pour instruction de prendre en compte celui qui a prononcé l’occurrence de je” (Kleiber, 2004: 133). One might object that my argument has the consequence that indexicals cannot be translated because they would express different instructions in different languages: for instance, je would express the instruction of finding the utterer of je, while I would express the instruction of finding the utterer of I. Since these are different instructions, one would be forced to conclude that je has in French a different meaning from I in English. I believe that this conclusion is premature. In fact, there is an instructional meaning that je and I have in common: find who is speaking, i.e. the utterer of the words you are listening. Thus, there is a clear sense in which je and I have a common procedural meaning. However, given two different proper names, N and M, we cannot recover a similar common meaning, if Kleiber’s instructional view is correct.
Conclusion

In this paper I have shown that although metalinguistic theory has several merits, it has also some shortcomings which lead one to believe that it is not the best theory of the meaning of proper names. In fact, it has two consequences, the untranslatability of proper names and the impossibility of synonymy between names, which are in sharp contrast with our intuitions.

An alternative theory should account differently for the data which metalinguistic theory accounts for in a very natural way. In particular, it should provide a semantics for modified uses of proper names, a semantics that is different from that of the standard uses. The theoretical cost of giving a non-uniform semantics to standard and modified uses should be justified and counterbalanced with other advantages. Furthermore, the alternative theory should mediate, as metalinguistic theory does, between the ‘realist’ demands expressed by direct reference theories and the ‘cognitive’ demands expressed by the Fregean tradition. These are not easy tasks, but they cannot be disregarded if we are to move beyond metalinguistic theory, as I believe we should.

11 For a proposal along these lines, cf. Frigerio (2004) and Leckie (2013). These papers presuppose that proper names have two different meanings: the standard referential meaning and the modified predicative meaning, which derives from the first. However, it is showed that the process that leads from the first meaning to the second one is similar to other lexical processes which are very common in a large number of languages. Because of the high frequency of these lexical processes, the theoretical price of admitting two meanings is low. Furthermore, the modified predicative meaning is not the only one that comes from the basic referential meaning of proper names. For example, if we say that John is a Napoleon or that Mary is an Einstein, we give the names neither their standard referential meaning nor the modified predicate meaning (we do not mean that John is an individual called /Napoleon/ nor that Mary is called /Einstein/). Rather, we mean that John has some of the most salient characteristics of Napoleon (or usually attributed to Napoleon). Further meaning transformations are attested in addition to these (for a review, cf. Gary-Prieur 1994). Thus, the derivation of the modified predicative meaning from the standard referential meaning is not special because many derivations of different kinds from the basic meaning of proper names are possible.
References


