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Book Sections Year : 2009

Signification et référence dans les "Recherches Philosophiques" de Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations shows a break with the philosophy of the Tractatus, where meaning is asserted as a correspondence between thought and the world. The Investigations sees language as an action, and the word as the sign of a thing which is its reference. Wittgenstein strays from the influence of Frege and Russell, and comes closer to the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, G.H. Mead and C. Morris. New concepts are developed such as that of Language games”, which Wittgenstein thinks of as a “form of life”. The meaning of a word is not the thing that it represents but is determined by the rules which govern its use. Wittgenstein thinks that the context is essential in order to understand a word or a proposition. But context is not only linguistic, it is also social, anthropological and even biological.
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hal-02491225 , version 1 (25-02-2020)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02491225 , version 1

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René Daval. Signification et référence dans les "Recherches Philosophiques" de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Pierre Frath; Christopher Gledhill; Jean Pauchard; Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les langues et la pensée, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. Res per nomen, 1, ÉPURE - Éditions et Presses universitaires de Reims, pp.99-108, 2009, 978-2-915271-26-3. ⟨hal-02491225⟩
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