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« L'Ultime scepticisme ». La vérité comme régime d'interprétation

Abstract : What are Nietzsche’s reasons for criticizing truth, and how does he understand the consequences of his position for the philosophical praxis? The discovery of the opposition of truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and that truth is interpretation. It appears therefore to be a value, a type of error which has become essential for us, linked to a process of physical-psychological absorption. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer; its aim is to investigate the value of this particular value, and to create new “truths.” Being a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicure’s pattern rather than on Plato’s.
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Patrick Wotling. « L'Ultime scepticisme ». La vérité comme régime d'interprétation. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, Presses Universitaires de France, 2006, Nietzsche, 131 (4), pp.479-496. ⟨10.3917/rphi.064.0479⟩. ⟨hal-02530170⟩



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