"Ultimate Skepsis": Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of Interpretation - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles PhaenEx Year : 2016

"Ultimate Skepsis": Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of Interpretation

(1)
1

Abstract

What are Nietzsche’s reasons for criticizing truth? How far does such criticism extend, and how does Nietzsche understand the consequences of his position as regards the philosophical praxis? The discovery of a radical opposition between truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and, at the same time, that truth is interpretation. On closer scrutiny, it appears to be not an essence, but a value, that is to say a type of error that has become essential for the continuation of our life, linked to a long process of physical-psychological absorption, and now productive of a deceptive feeling of necessity. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer: first, because, as a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicurus’ pattern rather than on Plato’s; and more importantly, because the philosopher’s real aim is to investigate the value of all particular values (including “truth”) for the development of human life, and, in accordance, to create and impose new “truths.”

Dates and versions

hal-02532649 , version 1 (05-04-2020)

Identifiers

Cite

Patrick Wotling. "Ultimate Skepsis": Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of Interpretation. PhaenEx, 2016, 11 (2), pp.70-87. ⟨10.22329/p.v11i2.4782⟩. ⟨hal-02532649⟩
32 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More